Evidence - Admissibility of the Fact and Amount of a Compromise Settlement with One Joint Tort-Feasor in the Trial of a Second Joint Tort-Feasor - Burger v. Van Severn, 39 Ill. App. 2d 205, 188 N.E. 2d 373 (1963) by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 1 Fall-Winter 1963 Article 17 
Evidence - Admissibility of the Fact and Amount of a Compromise 
Settlement with One Joint Tort-Feasor in the Trial of a Second 
Joint Tort-Feasor - Burger v. Van Severn, 39 Ill. App. 2d 205, 188 
N.E. 2d 373 (1963) 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Evidence - Admissibility of the Fact and Amount of a Compromise Settlement with 
One Joint Tort-Feasor in the Trial of a Second Joint Tort-Feasor - Burger v. Van Severn, 39 Ill. App. 2d 205, 
188 N.E. 2d 373 (1963), 13 DePaul L. Rev. 164 (1963) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol13/iss1/17 
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
ployment, which caused an engineer to reject a professorship 3 and a
baker to become a cub reporter.8 4 A plaintiff's changing her residence
and enrolling in a beauty culture school were also held to be conditional
acts rather than bargained-for consideration. 5
Analysis of the instant case discloses that Mr. Grace's promise was not
of a contractual nature, anticipating consideration, but was rather the
promise of a conditional gift. Mr. Grace made a promise of a pension to
Mrs. Bredemann, an employee he was free to discharge. He contemplated
no consideration but certainly a condition. It would, of course, be a con-
dition to a promise of pension that the promisee retire. Illinois formerly
adhered to a traditional interpretation of the law of contractual considera-
tion. The decision in Bredemann v. Vaugban Mfg. Company circum-
scribes a shadowy border of doubt around an area once defined with
clarity.
33 Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936), 21 MINN.
L. REv. 748 (1937).
3 4 Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 118 A.2d 316 (1955).
35 Coder v. Smith, 156 Kan. 512, 134 P.2d 408 (1943).
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF THE FACT AND AMOUNT OF
A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT WITH ONE JOINT TORT-
FEASOR IN THE TRIAL OF A SECOND JOINT TORT-
FEASOR
The plaintiff, John Burger, was a self employed contractor engaged in
building and repairing gutters. The defendant, The Rock Island Lumber
Co., a general contractor, contracted to replace roofing shingles and gut-
ters on a two story residence in Milan, Illinois. The defendant lumber
company then sublet the roofing work to the defendant, Henry Van
Severn, and the gutter work to the plaintiff. Van Severn commenced
work by building a scaffold from which to work on the roofing. The
plaintiff arranged to borrow this scaffold to work on the gutters of the
house (although there was some conflict in testimony regarding the exact
arrangements agreed upon). While he was working on the gutters, one
end of the scaffold gave way and the plaintiff fell sixteen feet, landing
upon a large railroad tie, causing him severe injuries. The plaintiff then
commenced suit against both the Rock Island Lumber Company and Van
Severn under the Illinois Structural Work Act,' alleging negligent con-
struction of the scaffold. Just prior to the trial, the plaintiff settled with
1 ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1961).
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the lumber company for $11,000.00 and covenanted not to sue it. The trial
resulted in a jury verdict against Van Servern, but the jury awarded no
damages. Throughout the trial, reference to the $11,000.00 settlement was
made repeatedly by both the trial judge and counsel for the defendant,
over the plaintiff's frequent objection. The trial court entered judgement
on the verdict and the plaintiff appeals, alleging that the fact and amount
of the compromise settlement should not have been admitted in evidence
before the jury. The appellate court, after a review of Illinois authority,
sustained the plaintiff's contention, and remanded the case for a new trial,
in accord with the rule pronounced in recent Illinois authority. Burger v.
Van Severn, 39 Ill. App. 2d 205, 188 N.E. 2d 373 (1963).
The first cases in Illinois were uniform in approving the admission of
such convenants before juries.2 However, these early cases all involved a
defendant's appeal from a judgement for the plaintiff on the grounds that
the contract entered into was a release rather than a covenant not to sue.
Thus, the plaintiff did not bring before the court the question of whether
the admission of such a covenant into evidence prejudiced plaintiff's right
to a fair trial.
However, when the Supreme Court was faced in 1911 with an identical
question in Devaney v. Otis Elevator Company,3 on defendant's appeal,
the earlier rule was overturned and such a covenant was held to be com-
pletely irrelevant in the trial of a joint tort-feasor. The court stated,
".... the $375.00 paid by the Otis Elevator Co. could not be considered
by the jury in part payment of the defendant's damage. . . . (E)ach
wrongdoer is responsible for the whole amount of damages and ... there
is no such thing as apportionment among wrongdoers. ''4 The court de-
clined to reverse, however, as the instruction could not be prejudicial to
the defendant.
Subsequent Illinois cases indicate that only one case really followed
the Devaney v. Otis Elevator Company, precedent.' Other cases were
either distinguished from Devaney on various grounds6 or the court, due
to preoccupation with other problems, failed to consider this issue fully,
but permitted the admission of covenants not to sue into evidence.7 These
2 Gore v. Henrotin, 165 II. App. 222 (1911); Vandalia R.R. v. Nordhaus, 161 Ill.
App. 110 (1911); Brennan v. Electrical Installation Co., 120 111. App. 461 (1905); Chi-
cago v. Babcock, 143 IMI. 358, 32 N.E. 271 (1892).
8251 II. 28, 95 N.E. 990 (1911). 4Id. at 36, 39, 95 N.E. at 994.
5 Scharfenstein v. Forest City Knitting Co., 253 111. App. 190 (1929).
6 Garvey v. Chicago Rys., 339 II. 276, 171 N.E. 271 (1930), where settlement made
after jury arrived at verdict; Onyschuk v. A. Vincent Sons Co., 277 Il1. App. 414
(1934), where settlement agreement admitted by stipulation; compare McManaman v.
Johns Mansville Corp., 400 1. 423, 81 N.E.2d 137 (1948).
7 Puck v. City of Chicago, 281 Ill. App. 6 (1935); Caruso v. City of Chicago, 305 111.
App. 571, 27 N.E. 2d 545 (1945).
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latter cases were considered adequate authority in two 1947 appellate
court decisions to support defendants' contentions that the refusal to ad-
mit covenants not to sue into evidence was reversible error on the grounds
that it permitted the plaintiff a double recovery. 8
The Appellate Court case of Aldridge v. Morris9 arose on plaintiff's
appeal from a jury verdict for defendant. After an exhaustive review of
Illinois authority, this court held that some adjustment for the prior settle-
ment must be made to prevent the plaintiff from enjoying a double re-
covery. The court approved the trial court's decision to admit the cove-
nant into evidence but indicated that it would also approve of a trial
judge's determination to exclude the settlement from the jury and deduct
the amount thereof from the jury's verdict, if any. The Supreme Court
noted the Aldridge case in N.Y.C. & St. L. R.R. Co. v. American Transit
Lines as a ".... well reasoned case.., which ... we very carefully con-
sidered on petition for leave to appeal and, after such consideration denied
it."'1 In this case, however, the defendant did not attempt to introduce the
convenant before the jury and the trial court deducted the amount of
settlement from the jury's verdict.
When an Illinois Appellate Court considered a similar question in 1951,
it treated the trial court's refusal to either admit the covenant into evi-
dence or deduct the amount of the prior settlement from the jury verdict
as distinct error."
This was the background of Illinois law when the Appellate Court for
the First District was confronted with the case of DeLude v. Rimek in
1953.12 The court promulgated the new rule that covenants not to sue a
joint tort-feasor are inadmissible in the trial of a second joint tort-feasor
and the trial judge should deduct the amount of such a settlement from
the jury's award, if any, because any such admission is potentially preju-
dicial to the plaintiff. The court stated that ". . . to permit the introduction
of the convenant and its attendant facts . . . would seriously jeopardize
plaintiff's right for a fair trial."'l The rationale was that the jury might
feel that the party who settled out of court was the real wrongdoer and
8 Bejnarowicz v. Bakos, 332 Ill. App. 151, 74 N.E.2d 614 (1947); Steowsand v. Check-
er Taxi Co., 331 Ill. App. 192, 73 N.E.2d 4 (1947).
9 337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N.E.2d 143 (1949).
10408 111. 336, 342.97 N.E.2d 264, 268 (1951).
11 Hyde v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 343 Ill. App. 388, 99 N.E.2d 382 (1951). This
was an unusual case where the plaintiff had settled with one joint tort-feasor for $4,500
and the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the trial against the remaining tort-
feasor was only $3,000. The jury had not been informed of the fact or amount of the
compromise settlement. A majority court indicated that the best means of handling the
situation would have been to introduce the covenant into evidence before the jury.
12 351 Ill. App. 466, 115 N.E.2d 561 (1953).
13 Id. at 474, 115 NE.2d at 565.
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thus find in favor of the defendant appearing before them. The court
professed to follow the principle of Aldridge v. Morris without causing
the plaintiff the injustice referred to above.
Since the DeLude decision, there has been no appellate court reviewing
Illinois authority that has failed to follow it fully.14
A brief survey of the law on this point in states other than Illinois in-
dicates that most jurisdictions provide that some deduction should be made
from a judgement if the plaintiff has received money for a covenant not
to sue a joint tort-feasor, without setting out the specific manner of de-
duction. 5 Many states have ruled definitely that such a covenant is admis-
sible to mitigate damages. 16 Only two states followed the rule set forth in
DeLude v. Rimek 17 prior to 1953,18 and since that time two other juris-
dictions have expressly followed its rules. 19 There are also two jurisdictions
which refuse to permit any kind of a reduction in damages as a result of
such a covenant.20 Rules comparable to that in DeLude v. Rimek 2' have
also been adopted in two jurisdictions permitting contribution among
joint tort-feasors.22
The whole question of the desirability of this rule revolves around
whether there should be contribution among joint tort-feasors. Should
the plaintiff, at his option, have the right to sue any one of a number of
defendants and collect the entire damage from him? This is the current
14 Burger v. Van Severn, 39 I11. App. 2d 205, 188 N.E.2d 373 (1963); Ryan v. Mon-
son, 33 111. App.2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449 (1961); Frame v. Grecivich, 30 Ill. App.2d 271,
175 N.E.2d 415 (1961); Schumaker v. Rosenthal, 226 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1955), applying
Illinois law.
'5 Peats v. Martin, 133 So.2d 920 (La. 1961); Williams v. Colquett, 272 Ala. 577, 133
So.2d 364 (1961); Byers Bros. Real Estate and Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Campbell, 329
S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1959); Lysfjord v. Waldron, 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.Calif. 1955); Beck
v. Bel Air Properties, 134 Cal. App.2d 834, 286 P.2d 503 (1955); Lone Star State Life
Insurance Co. v. Foster, 250 S.W.2d 949 (Texas 1952); Green v. Lang Co., 115 Utah 528,
206 P.2d 626 (1949); Fagersburg v. Phoenix Flour Mills Co., 50 Ariz. 227, 71 P.2d 1022
(1937); Chisholm v. Vocational School for Girls, 103 Mont. 503, 64 P.2d 838 (1936).
16 Bolton v. Ziegler, Ill. F. Supp. 516 (N.D.Iowa 1953); Stevens v. Hurenburg, 117 Vt.
525, 97 A.2d 250 (1953); Raughly v. Delaware Coach Co., 47 Del. 343, 91 A.2d 245
(1952); Horner v. Town of Cookeville, 36 Tenn. 535, 259 S.W.2d 561 (1952); Giem v.
Williams, 215 Ark. 705, 222 S.W.2d 800 (1949); Solomon v. Dabrokski, 295 Mass. 358,
3 N.E.2d 744 (1936).
17 351 Ill. App. 466, 115 N.E.2d 561 (1953).
18 Bedwell v. DeBoit, 221 Ind. 600, 50 N.E.2d 875 (1943); Jacobsen v. Woerner, 149
Kas. 598, 89 P.2d 24 (1939).
19 Ramsey v. Camp, 254 N.C. 443, 119 S.E.2d 209 (1961); Steger v. Egyud, 219 Mid.
331, 149 A.2d 762 (1959).
20 Western Springs Service Co. v. Andrew, 229 F.2d 413 (10th Cir., 1956), applying
Colorado law; Papenfus v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 254 Wis. 233, 35 N.E.2d 920 (1949).
21351111. App. 466, 115 N.E.2d 561 (1953).
22 Oliver v. Russo, 29 N.J. 418, 149 A.2d 213 (1959); McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d
659 (D.C.Cir. 1943).
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view of most courts, 23 although there is growing a trend of authority to
the contrary.24 However questionable this rule may be,25 it is beyond the
scope of this study to inquire further into this broader question.
Thus, if we accept the hypothesis that there should be no contribution
permitted among joint tort-feasors, it follows that any settlement with
one joint tort-feasor, no matter how large or small, should not infringe
on the plaintiff's right to collect the entire balance of his damages from
any other joint tort-feasor. He could have collected the entire amount
from any defendant he chose. There would also seem to be no argument to
refute the contention that the admission into evidence of a previous set-
tlement from one joint tort-feasor might lead a jury to believe that it had
the wrong party before it, or that the plaintiff had received adequate
compensation for his injury. It would therefore appear that the rule in
DeLude v. Rimek and Burger v. Van Severn represents the better reasoned
view for adjusting a judgement where the plaintiff has received a settle-
ment out of court from a joint tort-feasor.
Since no recent case applying Illinois law has followed any other rule,
it seems clear that this is the current Illinois law on this issue, and it
would seem likely that other jurisdictions will follow the lead of North
Carolina and Maryland in adopting this rule in succeeding years.
23 Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. C., B & Q. R.R. 196 U.S. 217 (1904); Chapin v.
C & E.I.R.R., 18 Ill. App. 47 (1885); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, S 879 (1948); See generally
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 418 (1937).
24 E.g. Judson v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 25 N.J. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957);
George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 187 (1947);
Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co.,
292 Pa. 354, 141 231 (1928).
. 25 See also Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn. Rys., 110 Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924),
where following this rule blindly led to a blatantly unjust conclusion.
PATENTS-PATENTABLE INVENTION: QUESTION
OF LAW OR FACT?
Brothers Incorporated brought action against Browning Mfg. Co. to se-
cure a declaratory judgment that United States Patent No. 2,610,557, relat-
ing to a pneumatic roller compactor, was invalid since the claimed inven-
tion had been fully described and illustrated in a printed pamphlet which
had been prepared and publicly distributed by Browning Mfg. Co., more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent.' Browning
1 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) states: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the in-
vention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country
or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States."
